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INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret analytical and continental philosophies regard 
one another's enterp_rises with mild indifference, fueled occasionally by 
bouts of fierce contempt. Each believes what it does is philosophy, and 
what "they" do is not. How do two so radically different philosophical 
schools overcome their professional disdain for each other without com-
promising their own positions? 
While there are many different reasons for this situation, one 
assumption encouraging it which the philosophical tradition reinforces 
must be rejected. Both camps embrace a presupposition of methodological 
economy, that some single philosophical method, theory, or position must 
account for experience more successfully than those methods, theories, 
or positions which account for it by means of depending upon one an-
other. This application of Ockham's razor at the level of method hind-
ers theories from uniting forces for attempting a more successful man-
agement of experience. 
As theoretical reflection upon concrete experience, philosophi-
cal theories can manage experience more successfully than they previous-
ly have by seeing how several different positions and methods complement 
one another than by trying to dismiss and undermine one another. In 
view of the theorizing revolutions of early twentieth century science, 
the assumption of what Karl-Otto Apel calls methodological solipsism 1 
iv 
blocks philosophical theories from adequately accounting for concrete 
experience. The first chapter argues this presupposition is not a nec-
essary condition for successfully dealing with experience. The second 
chapter proposes philosophical positions, analogously to Bohr's and 
Heisenberg's complementarity thesis of the relationship between classi-
cal and quantum theories of physics, be recognized as attempts to meet 
the shortcomings of the tradition in order to bring it to completion. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
VITA 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 
I. CONFRONTING METHODLOGICAL SOLIPSISM 
Distinctions are Introduced into Experience 
Thinking: Acting upon Experience 
Feeling: Reacting to Experience 
Experience Management Failures 
Scientism . 
Historicism . . . . . . . . 
II. PROPOSING METHODOLOGICAL COMPLEMENTARITY 
Heisenberg's "Lesson of Quantum Physics" 
Complementarity and Contemporary Philosophy 
On the Possibility of Meaning . . . . . . . 
CONCLUSION 
NOTES ... 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
vi 
Page 
. ii 
iii 
. iv 
1 
1 
3 
5 
6 
7 
8 
11 
11 
15 
20 
25 
27 
30 
CHAPTER I 
CONFRONTING METHODOLOGICAL SOLIPSISM 
Distinctions are Introduced into Experience. Analytical and 
continental philosophers balk at the suggestion that more similarities 
than differences exist between their methods. Phenomenology, by means 
of intuitions, and analytic philosophy, by means of concepts, share an 
affinity with respect to how each operates in the process of inquiry. 
In both camps, reason has an unrelenting need to secure what it deems to 
be clear and distinct knowledge. 
Loosely speaking, a concept is a general representation enabling 
knowers to organize their world, mediating the differences between sub-
jects, objects, and one another. Kant's pure principles of the under-
standing, the categories, means for the experience of nature, are con-
cepts. Intuitions, on the other hand, are what is known immediately, 
without representation, by someone of something nonpropositional, i. e. 
unrepresentable experiences, such as knowledge of oneself, the external 
world, universals, and values. 
Martin Heidegger illustrates the difference between concepts and 
intuitions with the "ready-to-hand" (Zuhandsein, intuitions) and the 
"present-at-hand" (Vorhandsein, concepts). But his illustration defines 
both concepts and intuitions only by reference to the activity (or the 
1 
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lack of activity) of subjects. 2 Not all experience is initiated by a 
knower. No conscious activity produces intuitions in experience. What 
produces them is phenomenal activity. Mathematical intuitions are real-
ized by consciousness: their certainty springs from feelings of obvi-
ousness phenomena produce in consciousness. Attention to things does 
not produce them, William James writes; they "come to us by their own 
laws. [T]he feeling of attending need no more fix and retain the 
ideas than it need bring them." 3 
For example, the distinction between between interpretation and 
explanation comes out of experiencing resistance, having attraction as 
is its necessary condition. Attraction denotes a relationship between 
"things" either naturally or involuntarily drawn toward each other. 
While physics takes this relation to be natural, other world-views re-
gard the same relation as involuntary. It is as if one needs to distin-
guish an "attraction1" from an "attraction2 ," the pull (positively) re-
ferring to nature vs. the pull (negatively) referring to will. 
Experiences of resistance in dealing with life convincingly shows those 
experiences do not open up the world; it is because the world can and 
does open up that such experiences are possible.~ This implies distinc-
tions like nature/will, subject/object, and so forth, are introduced 
into experience for the sake of arranging and controlling it. What 
fuels the fires of philosophical exploration and interpretation is in-
terest, involvement, engagement, concern. 
Philosophy reflects on experience in order to handle life as 
clearly and as completely as possible. The history of philosophy has 
3 
assumed all possible experience can and should be managed by some single 
philosophical theory or position. The following two sections are an 
overview of the methods of reflection presupposed by theoretical dis-
tinctions introduced into experience, viz., thinking vs. feeling. 
Thinking: Acting upon Experience. Conceptuality is categori-
al, and categorial thinking separates some things from other things, ar-
ranging reality according to some determinations held to be more signif-
icant than others. Ideas about how categorial thinking works have 
changed over time, because ideas about what categorial thinking acts 
upon, namely experience, have shifted from those of stability to those 
of fluctuation. In Kant's time, it was supposed nature fit into sepa-
rate, neat, clear-cut categories, like a pigeonhole. Instances of na-
ture not fitting were, in principle, impossible. Today concepts hang 
woven together like a fishing net, catching from experience whatever 
does not slip through its weave. Experiences of novelty, spontaneity, 
and possibility support the image of nature's dynamis. 
Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein initially sought a neutral con-
ceptual framework in which all other operational frameworks could be 
grounded. Heidegger's aim in Being and Time was to discover and make 
explicit a fundamental ontology, a doctrine of categories to act as a 
foundation supporting each and every theory of existents. The Tractatus 
Wittgenstein had believed standards of meaning were merely the logical 
forms of the language to be understood. Later on, however, he explicit-
ly rejects this. 5 In its place he posited a plurality of rules of possi-
ble language-games, guided by the situational context and "forms of 
4 
[human] life." Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's turn to language were at-
tempts to move from the conceptual to the preconceptual or intuitive 
level of knowledge. 
Language is used with an indefinite, unlimited number of terms 
(both actual and possible), and each of any number of terms may perform 
several different functions. Both Wittgenstein and Heidegger believed 
examining the context of a term and its use shows the various roles it 
plays within language. 6 Linguistic analysis is divided between continen-
tal and Anglo-American philosophy with respect to the intuition/concept 
distinction, with the emphases falling on language's content vs. its 
logical form. Whether one begins with particular words and aims for 
general conclusions about language or with language and seeks the con-
tent of words, one learns linguistic investigation, instead of providing 
a neutral framework for pseudo-objective examination, only forces the 
investigator to recognize language itself as a part of the subject mat-
ter under investigation. 
Stephen Erickson rightly notes "the notion of an entity existing 
independently of human agency and awareness" is highly suspect. 7 Being 
and language are two theoretical determinations drawn out from a dis-
tinction-free "primeval pool," which James names pure experiences. The 
diversity of interests bearing upon this hypothetical construct yields 
ordinary, everyday, "lived" (immediate) experiences. "The interest 
makes experience more than it [interest] is made by it 
[experience]."' Nothing appears to get outside of interests once and for 
all; even "purely" theoretical constructs (like James's "pure experienc-
5 
es") still serve a purpose. Interests perform in contexts of purpose, 
at work before any separation between subject and object, between free-
dom and nature, between science and art, between thinking and feeling. 
Successful philosophical strategies have the ability to apply different 
determinations for managing different situations in experience. 
Feeling: Reacting to Experience. Where analytic critiques of 
knowledge concentrate on the construction of concepts, phenomenology 
takes up the intuition side of the coin of experience, in order to guard 
against unnecessary reductions of experience. 
Heidegger's notion of logos is more or less identical with 
James's notion of "pure . " experiences, the theoretically primordial 
source of distinctions. Now Heidegger's approach toward this distinc-
tion-free construct comes from the side of feeling. His strategy is to 
refrain from acting, to resist the urge to draw distinctions out of it, 
to allow the distinctions to make themselves felt. Pure experiences 
(i.e., purely theoretical experience) can never become ordinary experi-
ence without persons to experience them. 9 Feeling indicates the direc-
tion of acti:vity between the object/subject poles. Where thinking is 
the activity of consciousness upon phenomena, feeling is the activity of 
phenomena upon consciousness. Heidegger conveys this with his "Being" 
expression: where traditional metaphysics (synonymous with categorial 
thinking) tried to represent this, overcoming metaphysics is a matter of 
overcoming the urge to represent, to express the "idea" of Being in such 
a way without mediating the difference between it and beings. 10 
6 
Heidegger uses this background with his discussion of moods. 11 
Critiques of knowledge have been unaware of the intuitive side of in-
quiry, always leaving the questioning under the inquirer's thumb. 
Moods, though, are beyond conscious control, something one finds oneself 
in, not in oneself. The philosophical tradition relied too often on its 
ability to cut its object of study to pieces. Most recently, and espe-
cially in Continental philosophy, the discipline has overreacted by cre-
ating the opposite reliance of unbounded invention, neither giving nor 
subjecting itself to show some warrant of its authority. 12 
In careless hands, phenomenology's strength easily becomes its 
most dangerous enemy. Herbert Spiegelberg recognizes this danger as he 
defends the epistemological rights of hermeneutics by maintaining it "is 
a matter not of mere constructive inference but . . . at most [one] of 
an intuitive verification of anticipations about the less accessible 
layers of the phenomena." 13 Hermeneutics appears to border on mysticism; 
it commits philosophical fraud if it foregoes verifying felt intuitions 
only to celebrate sublime feelings. It is necessary and important for 
philosophy to recognize the value of feelings, but it is not sufficient. 
Experience Management Failures. The desire to control all 
possible realms of experience by means of a single theory has blocked an 
adequate way of dealing with life. If thinking dominates the attempt to 
manage experience, the gains of formal clarity are negated by the losses 
of content and completeness. Conversely, if feeling overrides thinking 
in directing life, choas results, without definition or delimitation. 
Both of these moves are unsatisfactory. Left to their own methodologi-
7 
cal values, unaware of one another, neither feeling nor thinking alone 
successfully manages experience. 
Scientism. Intellect, emotion, and will can be theoretically 
discriminated from one another. Any attempt at isolating them from each 
other in concrete investigation ought to be highly suspect. Science's 
ability to effectively manage its subject matter has greatly tempted 
philosophy to adopt and adapt a scientific attitude toward its objects 
of inquiry. Carried to the extreme of scientism, philosophy tacitly ac-
cepts certain determinations, namely, those most directly linked to 
mathematical frameworks, as more valid and valuable to their concerns 
while simultaneously suppressing other determinations and aspects of the 
situation. Suspicion should force a re-examination of the motivation 
for wanting to keep some aspects of the human questioner suppressed 
while allowing others to dominate the approach. 
By using a mathematical framework as the ultimately legitimate 
referential context, nature appears in pure objectivity. Stepping back 
from this context, and viewing the framework within a wider context of 
life, one realizes its objective "truths" are functions of science's 
specific interests in knowledge. From this different viewpoint, the 
outer relations marked by science are not so much experience as they are 
the results of experience subjected to an elimination process. 14 James 
argues this is the modus operandi of mathematical sciences such as me-
chanics, physics, and chemistry. In spite of nature's contradictory and 
defiant appearances, science comes up with the principle of its uniform-
ity. Outside of science's narrow context, a belief about the truth of 
this principle is one of convenience, not necessity. 
8 
By adding imagination to explanation for the sake of a coherent 
order of information, one no longer deals with a simple, clean, and di-
rect opposition between subject and object, questioner and questioned. 
An objectivistic bent in examination allows the illusion of a single ob-
ject of investigation: what is covers over its possibilities. The move 
to interpretation inverts this; possibilities are constantly breaking 
through attempts to decisively conclude the study. An interpreter needs 
help to avoid scientistic interpretation. 
Historicism. The opposite extreme of scientism is historicism, 
the view that the values of anything can be accounted for through the 
discovery of its origins and an account of its development. Like scien-
tism, it fails to adequately manage experience, though it fails for dif-
ferent reasons. The determinations historicism values (temporality, 
change, differences and contingencies) tend to overshadow and suppress 
others (timelessness, stability, similarities and necessities). 
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty characterizes the 
scientism and historicism of the philosophical tradition with his dis-
tinction between "systematic" and "edifying" philosophers. 15 In his ef-
forts to show philosophizing that values only determinations of thought, 
Rorty makes the same kind of mistake, albeit in a different way. He 
tries to do to the philosophy of the history of philosophy what Kuhn did 
to the philosophy of science. 16 Unfortunately, an historicistic under-
standing of experience, in and of itself, is no better than a scientis-
tic one: both insist upon a select group of determinations at the ex-
pense of others, and by doing so, each manages only a part of 
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experience. With respect to experience as a whole (a totality of all 
possible experience), each theory is inadequate. 
Instead of claiming the values of both science and history are 
needed, Rorty argues philosophy ought to give up one set of determina-
tions for another: "cultural anthropology (in a large sense which in-
cludes intellectual history) is all we need." 1 7 But it is not all we 
need. If one has cancer, do they seek a cultural anthropologist? Can 
the intellectual historian get a person from Chicago to Los Angeles in 
four hours? Needs are the results of a process acting upon wants. Var-
ious wants compete with one another, and those seeking first satisfac-
tion are named needs. Once they are satisfied, however, other wants be-
come "new" needs to be satisfied. Humans are temporal beings with a 
view to the eternal. They want and need both science and history, be-
cause both are ways of organizing experience. More importantly, having 
both science and history reminds one there is more than one way of deal-
ing with experience. Unaware of this, believing present management 
strategies are the only or best way of dealing with it, makes one less 
likely to invent new management strategies if old ones break down. 
This first part has tried to show people reflect upon experience 
in order to manage it as clearly and as completely as possible. The 
Western philosophical tradition has only recently recognized it has 
presupposed all possible experience can be controlled by some single, 
all-encompassing super-theory. No such position has been invented or 
discovered. Philosophy's two predominant means of reflection, thinking 
and feeling, when working independently and exclusively of one another, 
10 
have been only marginally effective in dealing with experience. Left to 
their own devices, each method ends in failure. 
The next chapter proposes to show how thinking and feeling, each 
with their own particular strengths in guiding experience, can offset 
and overcome each's particular shortcomings and limitations. The prec-
edent for such a proposal is Werner Heisenberg's account of how science 
uses two totally incompatible theories of physics, viz. the classical 
Newtonian theory vs. modern science's quantum theory of physics, to un-
derstand and explain nature. Ultimately, what governs the revolution in 
modern scientific theorizing, purposes, can direct a reformulation among 
contemporary philosophical reflection. 
CHAPTER II 
PROPOSING METHODOLOGICAL COMPLEMENTARITY 
The pertinent methodological task is not to decide between 
thinking and feeling, to appeal to one over the other. Distinctions 
like subject/object and intellect/will satisfy theoretical, aesthetic 
interests. Returning reflection to concrete experience seeks to meet 
practical, ethical concerns. Yet as returning reflection, the opposi-
tions invented at the theoretical level in order to gain a foothold in 
experience are transformed into kinships at the practical level in order 
to act upon and change experience. In this way the strengths peculiar 
to the opposing means reinforce one another by complementing each other 
in their common contest to gain mastery over life. 
Heisenberg's "Lesson of Quantum Physics." Part of the problem 
of getting linguistic analysts and phenomenologists to discuss their 
strengths and weaknesses lies in both camps' ignorance of contemporary 
science's program of methodology. 18 A variety of ways of looking at 
things can be employed in accordance with a variety of interests. By 
exploring various interests, one avoids both dogmatism and relativism. 
Modern science has significantly revised both man's understand-
ing of the universe as well as how to explain that understanding. With 
classical Newtonian concepts, physicists believed experimental findings 
11 
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were fundamentally dependent upon and explained by an unalterable theory 
of nature. This belief eventually gave way with the theorizing revi-
sions needed from the confrontation of classical concepts with modern 
scientific theoretic breakthroughs, such as Bohr's conceptual model of 
the atom and Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty. 
Together Bohr and Heisenberg developed what they have called the 
concept of complementarity. Primarily, it underlines how, in the meas-
urement process, the scientist interacts with the object; the object is 
not revealed as it is in itself but as limited to and affected by the 
nature of measurement. Technological advances gave access to realms of 
experience unavailable to "ordinary" experience. Bohr and Heisenberg's 
complementarity concept aimed to illustrate how two totally incompatible 
theories, such as the classical one based upon ordinary intuitions of 
space vs. the quantum theory based upon previously unobservable observa-
tions. The impact of their concept upon modern science was to encourage 
scientists "to apply alternatively different classical concepts which 
would lead to contradictions if used simultaneously." 19 Heisenberg felt 
active observation reveals an "impure" datum, affected by both theory 
and situational context. 
This attitude toward theorizing highlights Heidegger's claim of 
thinking bringing something before us, 20 i.e., thinking is representa-
tional. Representation generalizes from particulars, selecting only 
those determinations they have in common. For example, the concept 
"leaf" has to be general enough to be able to account for the different 
sizes and shapes among its various kinds. Heisenberg's indeterminacy 
13 
principle supports as a matter of degree instead of 
one of kind. The indeterminacy principle makes it possible for science 
to account for reality in terms of its factuality and also its possibil-
~. While the phenomena of atomic events are as real as any other 
more ordinary appearances, the entities postulated of them (atoms, elec-
trans, quarks) are less real because they are meant to refer to "a world 
of potentialities ... rather than one of things."21 
Heisenberg's complementarity thesis is philosophically signifi-
cant because it claims the relation between observed and observer works 
in two directions. Experience is the result of consciousness organizing 
appearances and of appearances acting upon consciousness. The inability 
to see the whole picture is due to both mind and world, as each attempts 
to secure the other once and for all. Given this, the old image of na-
ture as passively yielding to scientific inquiry has been replaced by 
one of nature revealing itself as it, as well as the observer, chooses. 
Where thinking gives consciousness a degree of control over things, 
feeling gives things some control over their presence to consciousness. 
In thinking, consciousness pursues phenomena. In feeling, phenomena 
pursue consciousness. 
Wittgenstein suggests it is unreasonable to insist upon an idea 
of completeness of language. Language has evolved, retaining what sur-
vives through time while adding to itself new discoveries (e.g. chemis-
try or calculus). 22 Heisenberg also opposed the postulate of complete 
logical transparency of concepts. By attempting to extend the investi-
gation of nature to its most remote parts, he argues, one cannot really 
14 
know ahead of time how to qualify their use of particular concepts. In 
some instances concepts will be used in unwarranted and meaningless 
ways. 23 Accumulation over time has made both language and meaning grow 
ever more subtle and complex. The progress of theoretical constructs 
depends upon seeing old problems in new ways, upon taking experience not 
as a collection of "brute facts" but as having a focus of reality en-
framed by the background of its possibilities. 
The notion of complementarity, along with Heisenberg's principle 
of indeterminacy, emphasizes the irreducible connection between an in-
vestigation's process and its conclusions. Neither of these can be what 
it is without the other. Fields of experience opened up by technologic-
al advances are clearly known once they are enclosed within theoretical-
ly constructed limits and distinctions. These limits are not completely 
a matter of rationality. Though one can give reasons for choosing some 
determinations instead of others, the reasons themselves do not make the 
choices. Decisions contain an element of irrationality necessary to the 
task of rational deliberation. 24 Reality is a combination of the rela-
tions an enquirer thinks into as well as feels from experience. 
Consciousness structures experience in conjunction with phenome-
na. Some ten years before Heisenberg was born, James proposed "reality" 
to be a function of two conscious determinants. 
That we can at any moment think of the same thing which at any for-
mer moment we thought of is the ultimate law of our intellectual 
constitution. But when we now think of it incompatibly with our 
other ways of thinking it, then we must choose which way to stand 
by, for we cannot continue to think in two contradictory ways at 
once. The whole distinction of real and unreal, the whole psycholo-
15 
gy_ of belief, disbelief, and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental 
~--first, that we are liable to think differently of the same; 
and second, that when we have done so, we can choose which way of 
thinking to adhere to and which to disregard. 25 
Reality is a matter of thinking and choosing; they mutually affect one 
another. Deliberation and decision belong to consciousness together. 
Complementarity and Contemporary Philosophy. The distinction 
between thinking and feeling, like other distinctions, serves its pur-
pose by separating experience into two parts, in this instance, distin-
guishing two modes of consciousness. Consciousness is itself only a 
part of experience, as opposed to the phenomenal. Heidegger, by con-
trasting the ready-to-hand with the present-at-hand, outlines a distinc-
tion of two "elements" yet shows those two elements are still fundamen-
tally connected. 26 As connections, relations bridge the 
phenomena/consciousness distinction. Thinking and feeling differ with 
respect to both sides of this distinction. Usually thinking and feeling 
are ascribed only to consciousness. Instead, thinking is the activity 
of consciousness dealing with phenomena, and feeling is the passivity of 
consciousness as it is dealt with by phenomena. When consciousness 
thinks, phenomena feel, and when phenomena think, consciousness feels. 
It sounds animistic to describe thinking and feeling as activities of 
both phenomena and consciousness, but it reminds one that thinking and 
feeling are not exclusively conscious activities. 
As universal deception is impossible because the meaning of de-
ception depends upon the meaning of truth, so also all possible investi-
16 
gations must begin from something rather than nothing. As a term, 
"nothing" only makes sense by means of its relation to the term "some-
thing." Take away something, and there is nothing; take away "some-
thing," i.e., the logico-grammatical structure presupposed by the term, 
and communicative activity is no longer possible. Erickson points out 
how the philosophical tradition, especially German idealism, has argued 
how something is something and avoids being nothing by virtue of having 
at least one determinate characteristic, 2 7 a mark or evidence of some 
source conditioning the possibility of beings. 
Relations are not purely conceptual entities. Concepts are con-
sciousness 's way of dominating phenomenal experience. Relations are 
both thought into and felt within experience. The prejudice of the 
philosophical tradition to value thinking over feeling is not enough to 
demonstrate feeling is not as significant as thinking. And though the 
opposite bias of feeling over thinking seems a plausible response, it is 
only a different way of committing the same mistake. Whether feeling or 
thinking is more important is an irrelevant and ultimately self-defeat-
ing question for philosophical methodology. 
The opposition between thinking and feeling serves a knowledge-
interest at the level of subject/object. Ways of living are reviewed at 
a self/others level. The opposition between thinking and feeling is 
subsumed at this level, because self-reflection requires the combination 
of their strengths. Jurgen Habermas claims "what unites the identity of 
mind and nature with their non-identity can itself be conceived accord-
ing to that type of synthesis through which the identity of an ego comes 
17 
into being. 1128 Being determinate is not Being's only kind of Being. A 
composite of creative imagination and critical discernment, of feeling 
and thinking acting in concert in order to survive, ought to be the mod-
el for philosophical methodology. 
Clear knowledge can be had only with "closed theories," theories 
applied to already clearly delimited realms of experience. Drawing lim-
its means some possibilities attract more attention than others. Possi-
bilities keep realities alive, dynamic, and vigorous by attempting to 
"overthrow" the reigning determinations. On the positive side, forget-
ting possibilities secures experience. If forgotten too long, ordinary 
experience becomes boring. Conflict and competition can be an advantage 
for opposing philosophical theories. Think of how much has been learned 
by the two camps refutations of one another. The complementarity of 
theories need not suggest all conflict and strife will disappear. Phil-
osophical examinations which realize social as well as metaphysical or 
epistemological connections with the world know both analysis and intui-
tions occupy every turn of a spiraling process of investigation. 
Instead of linking limitation solely with consciousness, it has 
to be seen as effecting the whole of experience. The categorizing and 
schematizing the world reflected in the history of the tradition is evi-
dence of consciousness's drive to dominate appearances. While not all 
of consciousness's attempts to control phenomena succeed, those failures 
have been attributed to the weakness of consciousness rather than to the 
strength of appearances. This is a difficult habit to break. Thanks to 
the genius of people like Heisenberg, science has been able to recognize 
18 
experience's capacity to arrange and re-arrange itself. It takes a cri-
sis of consciousness (for example, an infinite regress) for its reflec-
tion to move to a level over and above its "ordinary" referential con-
texts. The infinite regress experience tempts consciousness to ground 
its examination objectively at a "language-game" level. 29 Reflection can 
operate on something other than itself, yet when the other denies it 
satisfaction, it reflects upon itself, i.e., it performs self-reflec-
tively. Moving from the level of subject/object frameworks to a level 
of the examination of frameworks, the self/others level, the move to a 
transcendental-pragmatic level of intersubjective argumentation, makes 
the conditions of critical discussion non-objectifiable. The "object" 
of the discussion is the structure proposed by consciousness. 
Recognizing possibilities as possibilities is a primary task of 
self-reflection. Experience itself is the result of the complementarity 
of thinking and feeling. Consciousness explicitly conscious of appear-
ances is simultaneously implicitly conscious of itself. By rising above 
the subject/object difference, complementary theoretical frameworks turn 
an essentially bipolar relation into a triadic one, consisting of three 
"elements" with three identifiable connections between the elements. 
Object, subject, and other subjects interact on two levels. At one lev-
el are connections between original subject, the object, and other sub-
jects. The other level is the relationship between the original subject 
and other subjects. At the first level, what individuals believe to be 
unbiased, interest-free accounts of their surroundings are brought to 
bear upon one another at the second level in order to see how the pres-
ence of the interpreter influences the interpretation. 
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Habermas supports Apel's two orders' distinction by claiming the 
addition of interpretation to explanation changes the relation of ob-
serving subject and observed object to "that of a participant subject 
and partner. " 30 Because interpretation depends upon a subject, anyone 
using the subject/object distinction as the key support of their frame 
of reference cannot reach a meaningful interpretation. This structure 
must be annexed by the further distinction of a self vs. others. 31 The 
individual's interpretation (who, it is assumed, has some procedural 
[though not necessarily "rational"] manner) is weighed in light of the 
procedures others hold to be valuable in assessing the interpretation. 
An individual interpretation's degree of meaningfulness and viability is 
affirmed or rejected by those standing outside of it. 
Psychoanalysis is Habermas 's example of how the opposition be-
tween thinking and feeling is placed within a more comprehensive context 
in order to challenge connections which are "not anchored in the invari-
ance of nature ... [but] in the spontaneously generated invariances of 
life history," connections altered or "dissolved by the power of reflec-
tion. 1132 The movement from the subject/object to the self/others level 
Habermas explains as the coming into being of an ego-identity. The 
shift takes up the opposition of the first level and employs it within 
the second. Philosophical theorizing needs to recognize inquiry finds 
significance in both space and time, and privileging either space (tra-
ditional empiricism, analytic philosophy) or time (traditional rational-
ism, phenomenology) over the other is a self-defeating project. The 
theoretical distinction between space and time must remain theoretical, 
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for the same reason one wants to preserve the difference between actual-
ity and possibility, or between foreground and background: the content 
of the terms lies in their relation to one another. 
Habermas claims one can describe a psychologically "unhealthy" 
individual to be experiencing a disturbance between life and language. 33 
Though repressed, a neurotic can meet the requirements of communal un-
derstanding and conform with its social amenities in everyday living. 
The price a person pays for this pleasant, charming facade are the feel-
ings of a hollow, gutted interior lying beneath it. The appearance of 
undisturbed communication with others may only mask the individual's 
disturbed self-communication. While the "language without" flourishes, 
the "language within" is abandoned, made inaccessible to the neurotic BI 
the neurotic. In a parallel fashion, a good philosophical methodology, 
by undertaking the activity of understanding, can help itself come to 
grips with itself. The myopia of an exclusively intuitive or exclusive-
ly conceptual philosophical approach is similar to the privatized por-
tion of the excommunicated language of the neurotic: according to only 
a single framework, each pretends to the appearance of being the defini-
tive expression of an appropriate method. In confrontation with other 
systems, "unhealthy" philosophical methods deny considering other ap-
pearing conditions. 
On the Possibility of Meaning. Truth-as-correspondence presup-
poses and depends upon an awareness of meaning. This awareness, Erick-
son holds, "is the means by which there first comes to be a cognitive 
world of experience--something given in a cognitive sense. 1134 W'ittgen-
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stein identifies the correspondence theory of truth as the highest 
achievement of rationality, yet holds language is an achievement over 
" d' " and beyond or 1nary reason. The difference between people and animals 
with respect to language, Wittgenstein says, is not simply a lack of the 
mental capacity needed for talking. He says, "they simply do not talk. 
Or to put it better: they do not use language. " 35 By this Wittgenstein 
means human beings "see" purposes to be met and look for ways to meet 
those purposes. Truth-as-correspondence presupposes meaning; it is a 
function of the framework in which it operates. Conditions also exist 
for the possibility of meaning. While it is a framework of truth, mean-
ing can also be a focus within a wider context, outlined against a back-
ground of purposes, a teleological backdrop. Whereas the needs of ani-
mals are met through instincts, inherent potencies beyond animal 
control, human "instincts'' can be controlled by will and reason. Ani-
mals do not "see" or realize anything like needs to be met as needs-to-
be-met because their innate capacities take on concerns without having 
to "think" about them. Humans, on the other hand, deal with their envi-
ronment by reason's light. The light which makes a solution to a prob-
lem possible is also responsible for the possibility of seeing a problem 
in the first place. 
The "commerce" between language and being is meaning. Physical 
signs grasped by psychical beings make meaning possible; reflecting upon 
the experience of knowledge makes knowledge of that experience possible. 
Wittgenstein's arrow points not solely on account of the "dead line on 
paper" (the physical sign) nor solely on account of some "psychical 
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h . " t 1ng. He writes "the arrow points only in the application that a liv-
ing being makes of it. " 31 Wittgenstein locates meaning in the use of 
some thing by some person. His inversion of these biases makes respon-
sible and energetic procedures possible. Instead of identifying under-
standing as a mental process, he suggests considering processes (mental 
and otherwise) as aspects of understanding. 37 Understanding, like inter-
ests and purposes, precede the separations organizing experience. 
Heidegger reflects Wittgenstein's inversion of understanding as 
he discusses meaning. Meaning is not identical with intelligibility, 
but entails intelligibility; 31 the intelligible has meaning, but not 
everything meaningful is intelligible. According to Habermas, intelli-
gibility is a knowledge-constitutive interest, a context guiding other 
interests. In order to shift intelligibility from framework to focal 
point, a more general background is needed. Meaning provides a back-
ground within which the intelligible is explainable and interpretable. 
Apel's critique of ideology tries to reflect meaning's capacity 
as a context for understanding through a reconstruction of "meaningful" 
experiences. The intersubjective community considers concrete episodes 
it regards as influential in its life and, knowing it cannot transport 
itself to a time prior to any separation, allows its collective experi-
ence to act as the parameters of what it means by meaning. 39 Setting a 
limit allows the critique to preserve and achieve a definite measure of 
responsibility, while dealing in experiences renews an ideology in vi-
tality and strength. 
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Functions re-introduce a context of teleology above ordinary 
everyday "ways of living." Each life-form is tested to see how it sat-
isfies life's demands. The operating purposiveness is like Kant's de-
piction of living as if the worlds of nature and freedom were one. The 
teleological background highlights the connection, the interaction, the 
conflict between freedom and nature. As facts are read into experience, 
meanings are appropriated from it; as facts are to interpretations, 
meanings are to purposes. 
Unfortunately, function or purpose is taken too narrowly by 
some, causing them to believe what is advocated is instrumentalism, and 
efforts to clear functions of this charge lead to subsequent charges of 
relativism. Now a desirable theoretical position lies between these 
two -isms, and agrees with concrete experience. Instrumentalism is too 
narrow a conception of function because one can imagine situations of an 
other than problem-solving kind, for instance, going out to a movie, 
where it makes more sense to speak of how the activity "satisfies" one 
than of how one "uses" it. If someone insists they used the movie, e.g. 
as an escape or diversion, the person fails to recognize any substantive 
difference between wants and needs. Instrumentalism, the notion an 
idea's truth is a function of its utility, addresses what human forms of 
life require, though not what those forms desire. Both needs and de-
sires are kinds of wants, and it is difficult to determine when the ne-
cessity wants imply crosses over from natural inner necessity and regu-
lation (needs) to willed outer "necessity" (desires). Objectors attack 
instrumentalism by supposing a theory of meaning must ultimately bias 
nature over and above will. 
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This objection is incorrect, for two reasons. First, instrumen-
talism addresses the connections of elements; to suppose it favors ei-
ther nature or will is merely wrong. Second, though it considers the 
relation between will and world, instrumentalism is an -ism for giving 
its account according to a single variable, viz. need or use. In con-
fronting experience, instrumentalism holds one either meets a need or 
fails to meet a need. Survival depends upon more successes than fail-
ures. Consequently, anything like desires is completely neglected by 
heavy-handed instrumentalism. 
Satisfying desires, on the other hand, need not be as success-
ful, because the possibility of their satisfaction is enough to keep de-
sires alive. Finding connections between nature and will do achieve 
some concrete results, meeting the needs of managing life adequately. 
More importantly, looking for connections in experience is an activity 
for its own sake, as a way of exercising the desire to master more of 
life than life deems necessary. In this way, the process of inquiry in 
and of itself determines the ultimate standards of meaningfulness. The 
struggle to manage life conditions what it means to manage it. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to show that various positions through-
out the philosophical tradition, especially as exemplified in contempo-
rary philosophy by the rival factions of analytical and continental 
schools of thought, have attempted to achieve both transparency of form 
and quality of content by means of some single theory or method. This 
drive for methodological economy has only created extreme positions that 
fail to meet the double aim. Two of these extremes are scientism, the 
sacrifice of content to the demands of mathematical clarity, and histo-
ricism, which seeks the completeness of accounts without concern for the 
compatibility of those accounts. 
The opposition between science and history concretely manifested 
itself in the revolutions of theorizing experienced by early twentieth 
century scientists. Bohr and Heisenberg accounted for the dichotomy be-
tween history and science by developing a concept of complementarity. 
The pull between science and history has also been experienced 
within contemporary philosophy. If several purposes reveal that differ-
ent positions, in conjunction with one another, offer an acceptable, ad-
equate way of guiding experience, why insist on one and only one theory? 
Philosophical reflection looks for connections in experience. In addi-
tion to the metaphysical and epistemological connections it has made and 
felt, it needs now to look for social connections of experience as well. 
25 
26 
This realm of connections opens up another layer of meaning. Nor can 
these connections be reduced to any simple pattern of use of an object 
by 8 subject. Needs are the focal points of a background of desires, 
and desires are responsible for the possibility of meaning. 
Philosophies that dismiss one another weaken the already fragile 
connection between life and reflection upon it. For Socrates, at least, 
life without this connection was not worth living. 
NOTES 
i See pp. 147-157 of Karl-Otto Apel's Towards~ Transformation of Phi-
losophy (trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby; London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1980) for his discussion of methodological solipsism. 
2 Also, Heidegger's contrast between Zuhandsein and Vorhandsein implies 
intuitions are epistemologically prior to concepts. 
J "Attention creates no idea; an idea must already be there before we 
can attend to it. . . [I]t is only to the effort to attend, not to 
the mere attending, that we are seriously tempted to ascribe spontaneous 
power." William James, The Principles of Psychology (ed. Frederick H. 
Burkhardt et al.; three volumes; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1981), I, p. 426. 
• "The summation of such experiences [of resistance] does not introduce 
the disclosure of the world for the first time, but presupposes it." 
Martin Heidegger, Bei_!!& and Time (trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Rob-
inson; New York: Harper and Row, 1962), § 43b, pp. 253-54 [210]. 
1 Apel, p. 7. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investiga-
tions (cited below), § 65, p. 31e. 
-,--
1 Stephen A. Erickson, Language and Being: An Analytic Phenomenology 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 8. 
1 Ibid., p. 155. 
' "Only those items which I notice shape my mind--without selective in-
terest, experience is an utter chaos." James, I, pp. 380-81. 
1 
"By responding [to logos], man gives voice . . . to world as well as 
to things and, thus, to Being and beings in their difference, which is 
nonetheless equally a belonging together." Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Onto-
logical Difference, Hermeneutics, and Language," in On Heidegger and 
Language (ed. and trans. by Joseph J. Kockelmans; Evanston, IL: 1972; 
pp. 195-234), p. 216. 
1 0 111.7 • th [ h I I 
w1 t e expression Being], I [mean] ... the presence of Being, 
more precisely the presence of the two-fold, Being and beings." Martin 
Heidegger, On the Way to Language (trans. Peter D. Hertz; New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 26-27. 
27 
28 
,!~··Although he may give them more credit than they deserve: "[T]he pos-
·' !bilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a 
:ay·compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods." Being 
and Time,§ 29, P· 173 [134]. 
--
u For example, see the section titled "Phenomenology of Reproduction" 
1 Alison M. Jaggar's and William L. McBride's article, "'Reproduction' a: Male Ideology," in Women's Studies International Forum, vol. 8, no. 3 
[1985], pp. 185-196. 
13 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical In-
troduction (second edition; two volumes; the Hague: Nijhoff Martinus, 
1971), II, p. 695. 
u For example, "our conviction of [the principle of uniformity's] truth 
is far more like a religious faith than like assent to a demonstration." 
James, II, p. 1233. 
11 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 369-370. 
11 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
1 7 "[T]here is no point in trying to find a general synoptic way of 'an-
alyzing' the 'functions knowledge has in universal contexts of practical 
life. 10 Rorty, pp. 380-381. 
11 Apel, pp. 147-48. 
11 Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern 
Science (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 179. Nor does Heisenberg 
restrict this concept to the realm of science: "we meet it when we re-
flect about a decision and the motives for our decision or when we have 
the choice between enjoying music and analyzing its structure." Ibid. 
2 D Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (trans. Ralph Man-
heim; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 118-19. 
21 Heisenberg, p. 186. 
22 "[A) k . . s yourself whether our language is complete;--whether it was so 
before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal 
calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of 
our language." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
(trans. G. E. M. Anscombe; third edition; New York: Macmillan; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1953), § 18, p. Se. 
23 H eisenberg, pp. 85-86. 
21o "Th . 
e decision may be the result of deliberation, but . . at the 
29 
same time . it excludes deliberation." Ibid., p. 205. 
21 James, II, p. 920. 
21 Being and Time, § 44b, p. 267 [224]. 
2 7 Erickson, p. 31. 
21 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (trans. Jeremy J. Sha-
piro; Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 44. 
29 Apel, p. 264. 
au Habermas, pp. 180-81. 
31 This is evidenced in Heisenberg's remarks about how the human atti-
tude toward nature has changed from one of contemplation to one of prag-
matics. See Heisenberg, pp. 196-197. 
32 Habermas, p. 271. 
33 Ibid., pp. 227-28. 
u Erickson, p. 113. He also cites Being and Time, § 32, p. 192 ff. 
[ 151 ff.]. 
35 Wittgenstein, § 25, p. 12e. 
3& Ibid., § 454, p. 132e. 
37 Ibid., § 154, p. 61e. 
31 Being and Time, § 32, pp. 192-93 [ 151] . 
39 Apel, pp. 167-68. 
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